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Abstract. The interaction between policy making and industry is a key to understanding 
the conditions for ‘greening’ contemporary energy systems. This article uses efforts toward 
greening the Mongstad oil refinery in Norway as a case to analyse the challenges involved in 
politically stimulated shifts towards increased sustainability in the energy sector. A technology 
test centre and a full-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) project at Mongstad were the 
centrepiece of  the Stoltenberg government’s (2005–2013) climate strategy. However, the 
project suffered delays and cost overruns until the full-scale carbon capture and storage 
project was eventually stopped. It is argued that interactions between the policy-making 
and industrial innovation arenas involved in this case are challenging because they operate 
according to different internal logics. We conceptualize this divergence as ‘policy/industry 
dissonance’ and suggest that this concept is a useful complement to literatures on regional 
innovation systems (RIS) and the multilevel perspective on sustainability transitions (MLP).
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Introduction
Interactions between the public sector and the industry innovation arena provide a key to 
understanding the current conditions for ‘greening’ contemporary energy systems. As 
institutional perspectives recognize, the state is shaping the foundations for energy production 
and energy markets by governing resources; among other issues, this involves establishing 
legal frameworks, initiating infrastructure development and controlling land use (Martin and 
Sunley, 1997; Norberg-Bohm, 1999). Persistent and stable public policy regimes are critical 
to driving changes in energy production and consumption (Grubler, 2012). Given concerns 
over the environment, climate change and energy security, it is of significant public and 
commercial interest that industries shift towards greener forms of energy production and that 
industrial stakeholders take part in stimulating such a shift through prioritizing innovation 
and investment for that purpose (Head, 2011; Porter and Kramer, 2011).
However, the transition to more sustainable energy systems presents significant challenges 
for policy makers and governments. For industry, the key driving force behind eco-innovations 
is generating business opportunities and reducing costs, and public sector institutions have 
a wide range of tools available to stimulate innovation and drive technological change. It is 
unclear which tools are appropriate and effective in different contexts. The broad question 
posed in this article is: how can we understand and conceptualize the constraints on policy-
efforts of greening large-scale energy production?
Our contention is that interactions between the policy-making arena and industrial sector 
innovation is challenging because these arenas operate according to different logics, and 
that understanding this ‘policy/industry dissonance’ is important in explaining the failure 
of public sector institutions in driving technological change. We identify three aspects of 
policy/industry dissonance: rationality, spatiality and temporality. Rationality dissonance is 
linked to notions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) and refers to the divergent objectives 
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and interests through which policy makers and industry actors approach a project. Spatial 
dissonance, understood through geographical concepts of site, scale, distance and context 
(Haarstad, 2014; Peck, 2011), refers to a mismatch between the territorial assumptions of 
the policy and the spatial composition and dynamics of the industrial project. Temporal 
dissonance, understood with reference to the timescales of energy transitions and industrial 
ecology (Desrochers, 2002; Grubler, 2012), points to the diverging time frames between 
policy and industrial innovation processes.
This contribution is intended to complement the literature on regional innovation systems 
(RISs) and the multilevel perspective on sustainability transitions (MLP), two perspectives 
that attempt to conceptualize the interaction between government and policy on the one 
hand, and industry and innovation on the other. In both these fields of research, public sector 
institutions are seen as elements in a broader system of actors, institutions and technologies 
that shape the conditions for innovation and change in industry practices (Asheim and 
Isaksen, 2002; Cooke et al., 1997; Geels, 2011; Kemp, 1994; Verbong and Loorbach, 2012). 
There has been a tendency, particularly within RIS, to operationalize public sector institutions 
simply as ‘supporting’ organizations that facilitate innovation and learning (see Asheim and 
Isaksen, 2002: 83). However, in certain geographical contexts and sectors the state plays a 
far more active role, as has been the case in the Norwegian petroleum sector and the present 
case study (Hull Kristensen and Lilja, 2011). Similarly, several recent contributions have 
suggested that appraising the specific agency of governmental institutions is difficult within 
the MLP, and so it is the role of spatiality (Coenen et al., 2012; Greenwood, 2012; Smith et 
al., 2010; Späth and Rohracher, 2012). Conceptualizing policy/industry dissonance can help 
refine understandings of relations between governmental institutions and industrial actors.
Examining policy/industry dissonance is particularly relevant for large-scale energy 
projects, since they typically require significant public backing as well as technological 
innovation in order to succeed. We use as our case study a project aimed at greening an oil 
refinery at Mongstad, Norway. The Norwegian energy sector has been described as exhibiting 
systemic interdependencies that create lock-in patterns around petroleum and hydropower, 
constraining innovation and implementation of new renewable energies (Christiansen, 2002). 
Converting Mongstad – Norway’s single highest point source polluter – into an international 
showcase for innovation in carbon capture and storage (CCS) was the main environmental 
and climate-related project of the government of Jens Stoltenberg. It was launched in 2006 
as Norway’s ‘moon landing’ because of its ambition to develop ground-breaking CCS 
technology. To this end, Statoil and other companies received ample institutional support, 
not least of which included public funding. Yet the project ended, at least symbolically, with 
the appearance of now-former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg in front of the Norwegian 
parliament’s standing committee on scrutiny and constitutional affairs, in February 2014. 
Shortly after losing the 2013 election, the Stoltenberg government had pulled the plug on the 
full-scale carbon capture project. There was widespread criticism of misappropriations of 
public funds, and both the State Auditor and a parliamentary scrutiny committee concluded 
that the Stoltenberg government had mismanaged the project.1
From this case study, we argue that the project failure cannot simply be explained by weak 
implementation or mismanagement, but rather by some crucial process differences between 
the policy-making and industrial sectors. We identify and explain rationality dissonance, 
spatial dissonance and temporal dissonance as they appear in this case. In the next section, 
we will briefly discuss theoretical perspectives on public and private sector interactions, 
(1) Whether or not the project was a failure is of course subject to debate. Stoltenberg and industrial 
participants in the project defended it, saying that important technological advances had been made 
and that these will benefit CCS projects elsewhere. The fact remains that significant resources went 
into planning for full-scale implementation of CCS at the site, and this did not materialize.
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explain our concept of policy/industry dissonance and outline our methodology. In section 
‘the challenges of greening an oil refinery’, we provide a contextual background for the case 
study. The core of the empirical analysis is presented in section ‘identifying policy/industry 
dissonances in the greening of the Mongstad refinery’, where we discuss the case through 
our policy/industry dissonance perspective. Finally, in section ‘conclusion’, we provide some 
general observations.
Theoretical background and framework
Policy making and industry in greening energy; or, why is configuring the right policy so difficult?
The role of the state in the economy has been one of the central issues in social science and 
politics for decades (Block, 1994). Most recent perspectives now recognize that the state 
plays a fundamental role in shaping the functioning and organization of economic markets 
(Martin and Sunley, 1997; Peck and Tickell, 2002), and that economic action is socially 
embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Public policy is an essential element in shaping the rate and 
direction of technological innovation in the private sector (Norberg-Bohm, 1999).
The relationships between government and industry have been conceptualized in different 
ways in the various subdisciplines of human geography. In the field of economic geography 
dealing with clusters and RISs, government is typically understood as supporting institutions, 
and charged with creating an enabling environment for inter-firm learning and co-operation. 
RISs are described as ‘regional clusters surrounded by “supporting” organisations’ (Asheim 
and Isaksen, 2002: 83). They emerge under conditions that facilitate a culture of co-operation, 
involve research and education institutions and provide appropriate means of finance (Cooke 
et al., 1997). Governmental institutions are seen as key to providing or facilitating some 
of these functions, but the primary determinants of innovation and economic growth are 
processes occurring within and between the firms themselves. The ‘success’ of governmental 
innovation policy is then conditional upon how this policy is fine-tuned to local and regional 
conditions. Tödtling and Trippl (2005) argue that innovation policy must be differentiated 
on the basis of the region type (central, peripheral, old industrial) it is targeting. Research 
experience from the Hordaland region (where Mongstad is located) and other regions in 
Norway also point to the need to better adjust policy instruments to industry type and to 
firms’ structural composition and innovation capacity (Rusten and Overå, 2014). Finally, the 
RIS literature tends to focus on knowledge and technology intensive industries, whose inertia 
and path dependencies are primarily related to human resources, competence and market 
positions (Malerba, 2010). For our case study, and for large-scale energy projects in general, 
inertia is significantly related to physical artefacts such as pipelines and huge mountain oil 
storage caverns.
The fundamental assumption in RIS, namely that innovations are conditioned by a 
broader system of relations in which government policy is one element, is shared by the MLP 
framework. The MLP attempts to explain the socio-technological contexts in which green 
technologies develop. From this perspective, radical innovations occur within ‘niches’, but 
their introduction and usage are conditioned by the way they become integrated into socio-
technical ‘regimes’ and socio-technical ‘landscapes’ (Geels, 2011). A socio-technical regime 
is understood as the coherent complex of scientific knowledge, production practices, user 
preferences, regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructure (Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
Technological transitions occur as multifaceted processes in which industrial innovation plays 
a key role, but these always co-evolve within a selection environment in which government 
is one actor (Kemp, 1994). In line with the RIS and production system perspective, the MLP 
stresses how government and policy shape and are being affected by the institutional and 
regulatory context in which innovations emerge. But government is typically conceived as 
only one element in the complex of relations, rules and motivations that actually trigger 
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and govern technological change. Critics have recently suggested that this makes it difficult 
to appraise the governability of and the agency involved in socio-technical transitions, as 
well as the way spatial dimensions influence conditions for transitions (Coenen et al., 2012; 
Greenwood, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Späth and Rohracher, 2012). Although there is a 
growing literature on the spatiality of sustainability transitions, empirical contributions have 
focused on local, regional and urban niches, rather than national levels and regimes (Hansen 
and Coenen, 2013).
Much of the RIS and MLP literature has been focused on assessing the effectiveness of 
various types of public sector support for stimulating innovation and technological change. 
In broad terms, we share this systems-oriented approach to understanding innovation and 
technological change. However, following on from the critics cited above, we contend that 
there is a need to further refine the way public–private interrelations are dealt with and 
analysed in these perspectives. Seeing the state as a facilitative, enabling or supporting 
institution – as RIS in particular tends to do – is related to a particular understanding of the 
public/private relationship, which may not be accurate for all geographical and temporal 
contexts (Martin and Sunley, 1997). In certain contexts, such as the Norwegian oil sector, the 
state has historically had a far more active role as planner and operator (Hull Kristensen and 
Lilja, 2011). While both RIS and MLP allow for mismatches between elements of the system, 
there is little focus on how these emerge historically or geographically, and how they can be 
conceptualized. Governmental policy and industry sectors may interact (or fail to do so) in 
very different ways from one project to another. The challenge for systems approaches such 
as RIS and MLP is to more accurately account for the diversity of relations between specific 
actors in the system, particularly relations between government and industry. Contributing 
to this enhanced understanding of relations between policy-making and industrial arenas is, 
theoretically speaking, the purpose of this article.
Conceptualizing policy/industry dissonance in the energy sector
In a general sense, our concept of policy/industry dissonance can be understood as a 
divergence between the internal dynamics within the arena of political decision-making on 
the one hand and the arena of industrial innovation on the other. In political science and 
public policy studies, there are long-running traditions that point to institutional inertia, risk 
minimization, resource constraints and elements of non-rationality in policy design (Head, 
2008; Rittel and Webber, 1973). While institutional inertia and non-rationality can probably 
explain many cases of weak policy design, our perspective is rather that actors in different 
arenas expectedly develop divergent practices, discourses and interests. An important part of 
the failure of governments to generate the intended industrial responses can be attributed to 
a divergence between these intra-sectorial logics, rather than to irrationality or inertia per se.
This concept of policy/industry dissonance can be disaggregated further and, on the 
basis of our case study below, we identify three aspects of dissonance: rationality, spatiality 
and temporality. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories but rather different 
aspects of policy/industry dissonance.
Rationality dissonance. It is a widely accepted notion in social science that people make 
decisions within particular frames that shape perceptions, limit information and condition 
choices, and these frames are often called bounded rationalities (March, 1988; Simon, 1957) 
This is not the same as suggesting that actors are irrational, but rather that the rationality 
and information actors employ in making decisions are not comprehensive and universal. 
Professional communities share particular frames of meaning (Grin and van de Graaf, 1996). 
Policy makers, technological entrepreneurs and firm managers are likely to draw on very 
different types of expertise and frame problems differently, which means that they are likely 
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to come to different conclusions about solutions and courses of action. Policy makers can be 
expected to design green policy packages on the basis of their own rationality and incentives, 
and work their own values and regional-political interests into them (Lipp, 2007). They are, 
of course, highly motivated by prospects of re-election. This means that implemented policies 
are rarely direct formulations of abstract political goals; they are rather results of complex 
negotiations between different interests.
For companies it is generally the profit motive that shapes their rationality (although some 
recent research (Bergek et al., 2013) complicates this picture in the renewable energy sector). 
This does not necessarily mean that their investments are not aligned with environmental 
concerns. Companies that anticipate future regulations by undertaking eco-innovations or 
implementation of technology that represents an environmental improvement can acquire 
competitive market positions (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Furthermore, reducing production 
costs through more efficient use of materials, manpower or energy, or reducing costs spent on 
pollution reduction or finding markets for byproducts, may be effective strategies in a business 
sense. The industrial ecology literature illustrates this well (Desrochers, 2002; Hews and Lyons, 
2008). Rationalities may be compatible across policy and business arenas, but they may also 
diverge significantly and create mismatches in project expectations, strategies and goals.
Spatial dissonance. Geography adds complexity to the relationships between public policy 
and industrial innovation processes in several different ways. Distance (both in relational 
and absolute terms) can stretch and dilute social relations, and the contextual specificities of 
place can create and maintain cultural barriers between policy makers and actors involved in 
innovation processes. Differences in the scale of policy-making, governance and innovation 
processes can uphold differences in knowledge regimes and bounded rationalities (Haarstad, 
2014; Jordan, 2008; Lindseth, 2006), and in turn fragment decision-making and make 
implementation difficult (Duit and Galaz, 2008). While policies appear increasingly ‘mobile’ 
and ‘mutable’ across different geographical contexts, they always involve certain territorial 
assumptions and conditions that complicate implementation in particular places (Peck, 2011).
Likewise, innovations and investment decisions have their own geographical dynamics 
(Rusten and Overå, 2014). Site characteristics such as energy infrastructures are embedded in 
space for long periods of time and tend to lock socio-technical systems into particular patterns 
of energy production and consumption (Unruh, 2000). These infrastructures are increasingly 
interconnected, and they are often stretched out across large distances and often across the 
jurisdictional boundaries of polities (Bridge et al., 2013). Therefore, policies typically only 
reach or cover parts of the interconnected systems, and the industrial dynamics of other parts 
of the system may work against the intentions of the policy. For example, a policy package 
may be targeting a particular region, while the regional industries are embedded in and 
shaped by geographical relationships that stretch much further. In other words, a dissonance 
can occur when there is mismatch between the territorial assumptions of the policy and the 
spatial dynamics of an industrial project.
Temporal dissonance. Processes in different sectors and niches of society work on different 
timescales, corresponding to the particular cycles in which tasks and reporting are completed. 
For example, politics are significantly shaped by election cycles as well as the time frames 
involved in political decision-making, while business sectors are shaped by the cycles of 
annual and quarterly reporting. For energy projects, the time cycles of political decision-
making and elections often correspond poorly with the longer time frames of constructing 
energy infrastructure, and the long-term horizons for upscaling new energy innovations 
(Grubler, 2012). Politically, projects are often processed within an electoral cycle, while 
energy infrastructure takes years to build and operate at a cost that can defend the large 
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investment, and therefore it takes several decades to render them obsolete. Actors within the 
different arenas have incentives to evaluate and plan activities and projects on very different 
timescales.
The difficulty of reconciling the respective timescales between political and industrial 
sectors is illustrated in the literature on regional development and industrial ecology. 
Environmental industrial projects, such as industrial symbiosis and eco-industrial parks, 
typically evolve dynamically over the long term, and are difficult for planners to organize in a 
top-down fashion (Desrochers, 2002; Deutz and Gibbs, 2008; Hews and Lyons, 2008). These 
projects illustrate how the development of complex energy projects involves timescales that 
are significantly different from those within politics. These timescale differences between 
political and industry arenas may generate temporal dissonance.
Methodology
The data for this study of the Mongstad refinery and the CCS technology project have been 
compiled from a detailed project history using a mixed methods approach. Sources include 
the academic literature, open or grey documents, the media, secondary data and personal 
interviews covering various aspects of regional and industrial development in the Nordhordland 
region since 2007. During this period, the authors have conducted personal, semi-structured 
interviews with the management of 34 local and national companies including Statoil and 
Statoil Mongstad, eight interviews with informants representing the industrial park, incubator, 
Chamber of Commerce, the education system and the municipality. Several of these have 
served as key informants. In addition, six interviews relating to national CCS politics were 
conducted in 2013 with representatives from public institutions and environmental NGOs. 
This includes the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Bellona Foundation and Zero (the 
latter two NGOs have been central in public debate on the issue). We have also reviewed 
minutes and documents from the parliamentary hearing in 2013. Our analytical assessments 
below draw on the interview material in particular.
The challenges of greening an oil refinery
In 2005, the Norwegian government announced plans to use the Mongstad refinery, Norway’s 
single highest point source emitter of CO2, as a site to test and develop technology for CCS.2 
CCS is a strategy of capturing CO2 before it is emitted into the atmosphere, and storing it 
through subsurface injections in geological formations underwater or on shore. There are also 
industrial applications for the captured CO2, most prominently its injection into oil and gas 
reservoirs to achieve enhanced oil recovery. Since 1996, Statoil has annually stored about 1 
million tons of CO2 from the Sleipner gas field in the Norwegian North Sea, where CO2 from 
the liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Melkøya at HAmmerfest is injected into geological 
structures in the gas field. It is widely believed that CCS technology is still immature for 
large-scale application as a cost effective climate mitigation option. It is also debatable 
whether this type of technology is actually a wise climate mitigation strategy, given the high 
cost and that it is predicated on the continued extraction of fossil fuels. Captured CO2 can be 
used for the production of various chemical products, but this requires industrial symbiosis 
and the co-location of chemical industries on the CO2 capture sites. An additional alternative 
for the captured CO2 would be to use this resource to produce oil-rich microalgae, which can 
be utilized as biofuel or as a nutrient in food products for humans or as a fodder ingredient 
for fish farming. As such, the greening of the Mongstad plant potentially involves a series of 
industrial projects that extend beyond the energy sector.
(2) The Statoil Mongstad refinery emitted 2.3 million tons of CO2 in 2012, which corresponds to 5.2% 
of Norway’s total CO2 emissions for 2012 (44 million tons). Source: Norwegian Environment Agency, 
see www.norskeutslipp.no.
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The Mongstad refinery was developed as part of national and regional industrialization 
strategies long before the greening of energy emerged as a serious concern. The initiative and 
planning for the Mongstad refinery in the late 1960s was developed by Norsk Hydro (at that 
time Norway’s largest processing company) with active engagement and support of the state, 
local and county authorities. The industrial commercial basis for Mongstad was that this 
industrial development could solve challenges Hydro had with providing sufficient access to 
material input needed for certain parts of their production (Kolstad, 1999).
Initial construction of the Mongstad refinery started in 1972, the same year as Statoil 
was established by the Norwegian government to ensure national and public control of the 
emerging oil industry (Nebben, 2009). The Mongstad refinery started production in 1975, but 
was soon seriously affected by non-competitive operational costs and market uncertainties 
with low prices. Many of the market difficulties came as a result of the OPEC oil crisis in 
1973 (Bjørnevoll, 2004). Statoil gradually increased its ownership share at Mongstad, and 
in the 1980s eventually became majority owner and plant operator. This ownership change 
meant a business strategy shift, since Statoil was almost entirely focused on oil production. 
A merger between Statoil and Hydro’s oil division, and Statoil’s purchase of Shell’s holdings 
in the refinery, gave Statoil full ownership control.
The Mongstad refinery was originally planned for and based on imported crude oil but 
with exploration and production in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, rich petroleum 
resources were suddenly found to be much closer. Mongstad is now a medium-sized, relatively 
modern refinery, directly linked to offshore fields through two crude oil pipelines, a natural 
gas liquids/condensate pipeline to the crude oil terminal at Sture, and the gas processing plant 
and gas pipeline from the nearby township of Kollsnes. The refinery has gradually expanded 
and consists of a crude oil terminal and an LNG processing unit and terminal. The facilities 
also include three mountain caverns totalling 1.5 million m3 of crude oil, which is received by 
ship as well as through pipelines from the major offshore oilfields (NPD, 2012).
The part-privatization of Statoil in 2001 and the gradual process of internationalizing 
their operations had several implications for Mongstad. Organizational changes within Statoil 
meant that management responsibilities were relocated from local units (such as Mongstad) 
to the operation headquarters in Bergen and corporate headquarters in Stavanger. Statoil is no 
longer considered a political instrument for regional and national development, but rather as 
a multinational corporation with an overall strategy to create profit to satisfy its shareholders 
(Rusten et al., 2005; Ryggvik, 2009).3 Another problem over the years is that the refinery has 
faced economic difficulties due to an overcapacity of these facilities in Europe. An additional 
market challenge is the U.S. government’s ban on the export of crude oil from its territory, 
which has put their refineries in a favourable market position.
The Mongstad refinery became central to Norwegian political debate in the mid-2000s, 
when Statoil applied for a licence to build an on-site gas-fired power generator. For years, 
gas-fired power has been at the centre of an ongoing political controversy over how climate 
and energy policy should be weighed and prioritized (Tjernshaugen and Langhelle, 2009). 
This controversy embodies Norway’s troubled position as both a leading country in climate 
and environmental protection and one of the world’s largest exporters of oil and gas. 
For much of the environmental movement and the left, gas-fired power plants became the 
(3) That Statoil initially was initially conceived as a political instrument is illustrated by the fact that 
three of its first CEOs had political backgrounds in the Labour Party (Nebben, 2009). The CEO who 
served during the Mongstad process, Helge Lund, had a business school and corporate background.
(4) It did, however, receive the NOK 6 million (EUR 800,000) needed to launch after negotiation 
between the two ruling right-wing parties in the Solberg government and their supporting parties in 
parliament in June 2014.
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key symbolic issue for mobilization of a generation of young environmental activists. In 
2000, the government resigned rather than granting licences to build gas-fired power plants 
without CCS.
When the liberal environmentalist party (SV) and the labour party (AP) formed a 
government in 2005 (in a coalition that also included the rurally based Centre Party, SP), 
the climate/energy dilemma – and the issue of gas-fired power plants in particular – came 
to the fore: should the governing coalition prioritize energy security and regional industrial 
development or climate responsibilities? The issue of gas-fired power plants had the potential 
to break the governing coalition. An agreement was finally reached that gas-fired power 
plants could be built, provided they were ‘based on CCS’, as the governmental platform 
statement read. As Tjernshaugen and Langhelle (2009) put it, CCS became the ‘political glue’ 
in the governing coalition.
When Statoil shortly thereafter applied for a licence to build the gas-fired power plant at 
Mongstad, this ‘political glue’ was tested. Statoil’s plans included upgrading the Mongstad 
refinery with a co-generation facility that would deliver heat to the refinery as well as 
power to the electrical grid (Osland and Rusten, 2005). The use of the gas-fired power plant 
represented a major new and additional source of CO2 emissions. After tense negotiations, 
Statoil was allowed to build the facility on the condition of abiding by a two-step process 
towards carbon capture. First, the Norwegian government, Statoil and a consortium of 
international companies would build a CCS test centre at Mongstad. Second, the state would 
fund a full-scale application for CO2 capture, to be operative from 2014. Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg characterized this solution as ‘Norway’s moon landing’, arguing that 
technological development of CCS at Mongstad would be internationally ground breaking.
The characterization of the CCS project at Mongstad as a ‘moon landing’ came to 
haunt the Stoltenberg government (Røyrvik et al., 2012). The programme quickly ran into 
overrunning costs and repeated delays. Critics in both the environmental movement and the 
right-wing opposition pointed to an unclear agreement between the state and Statoil that set 
few incentives for the oil company to promote the project. It became clear that installing the 
capture technology while the plant was in operation would be more challenging and expensive 
than foreseen. In addition, discussion emerged around the potential detrimental health effects 
from the amino solution used in the capturing process. The CCS test centre (Technology 
Center Mongstad, TCM) was opened in 2012, a year and a half behind schedule. At the 
same time, local industrial actors developed plans for using the captured CO2 in industrial 
processes, most particularly in an algae project in connection with the Mongstad refinery. 
The algae project CO2BIO is planned as a non-profit infrastructure laboratory, based on 
payment for using these facilities.
Shortly after the 2013 elections in which the Stoltenberg government lost power, but before 
the new government had formally taken power, the Stoltenberg government announced that 
the full-scale application of CCS technology at the Mongstad refinery had been terminated. 
As the ‘moon landing’ project was a major part of the government’s climate agenda, this was 
a significant blemish on the government’s legacy. As the new Solberg government took office 
in the autumn of 2013, the record of the greening of the Mongstad refinery was as follows 
(see Figure 1 for a timeline of the central events): 
 ● The gas-fired power generator was in operation without CCS, contributing to Mongstad’s 
status as Norway’s largest point source polluter.
 ● More than NOK 7 billion (about EUR 900 million) was spent on the planning of CCS at 
Mongstad, although no CO2 was captured.
 ● The implementation of full-scale CCS on the plant was called off and no plans for other 
implementation sites in Norway existed.
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 ● The CCS technology test centre had been built and technology options continued to be 
tested there. But it is disputed whether any applicable technologies had been developed 
by the end of 2013.
 ● The office of the auditor general had delivered a highly critical report on the organizational 
and financial management of the project.
 ● The spin-off projects, such as algae production, had suffered from a lack of funds.4
Identifying policy/industry dissonances in the greening of the Mongstad refinery
As a large-scale industrial project with clear political motivations, the greening of the 
Mongstad refinery was predicated on a relationship between the policy-making and industrial 
arenas. Reports by the State Auditor and the standing committee on scrutiny and constitutional 
affairs (Riksrevisjonen, 2013; Stortingets kontroll og kons.komité, 2014) revealed a series of 
weaknesses in the project’s logistical management, including insufficient cost control and 
a lack of clear project goals. One of the main conclusions of the State Auditor was that 
the complexity of the development of CCS at Mongstad had been underestimated when the 
original agreement with Statoil was made, and that this later limited the state’s opportunities 
for managing the project. What we are trying to show is that underlying these financial and 
organizational problems there are more fundamental disconnections between policy-making 
arenas and industrial actors. Analysing these disconnections can help explain why managerial 
problems occurred. Drawing on the terminology developed above, we will now explain the 
failure of the efforts of greening Mongstad through our notions of rationality dissonance, 
spatial dissonance and temporal dissonance.
Rationality dissonance: Actors are driven by different objectives and rationalities
The technological solution of retrofitting the gas-fired power generator with CCS 
technology was, contrary to the suggestions of the ‘moon landing’ rhetoric, a compromise 
between the parties involved. Actors in the policy-making and industrial sectors had 
different objectives and rationalities for accepting this compromise. By assessing the 
internal dynamics in each of these sectors, it becomes clear that their objectives and 
rationalities clearly diverged.
In the political realm, the central actors related to Mongstad by defending their ideological 
positions. The three political parties of the governing coalition: the AP, the Socialist Left 
Party (SV) and the SP had divergent agendas in relation to the gas-fired power generator. 
Figure 1. Timeline of significant events relating to Mongstad development.
CCS: carbon capture and storage.
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It was particularly the SV party’s need to exhibit a strong pro-environmental stance that 
clashed with the AP’s pro-industry and Statoil-friendly position. When Statoil applied for the 
gas-fired power generator permit, these party differences came close to bringing down the 
government. The CCS project at Mongstad came about as a solution to bridge these divergent 
positions. Allowing the project to go forward with the CCS project, and labelling this as a 
ground-breaking environmental project (akin to the moon landing), catered to the interests of 
both the SV and AP parties. It was a way for SV to stand behind an ambitious climate-related 
project at the same time as the AP could grant Statoil the licence needed to build the gas-fired 
power plant.
Looking at the dynamics internal to the political sphere, it can be suggested that the 
main motivation behind the project was not to lower CO2 emissions, but to bridge particular 
political and strategic positions. It is perhaps telling that the ‘moon landing’ project was 
cancelled just a few weeks after this governing coalition lost the 2013 general election. It 
was conceived by, and lived within, the Stoltenberg government. Opposition politicians have 
called the EUR 900 million price tag of the CCS project ‘the price to keep SV in government’ 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 21 September 2013). In short, the political motive behind the project 
was, to a significant extent, driven by party politics.
The industrial actors related to the project on the basis of quite different objectives 
and rationalities. The overarching logic of the industrial sector is, of course, economic 
profitability and it should also be expected that Statoil applied this rationality in dealing with 
the greening of Mongstad. In the case of the ‘moon landing’ project, Statoil’s objective was to 
get a licence to build the gas-fired power generator – in a sense, the CCS project was the price 
Statoil had to pay to get this licence. Several interviewees, for example, the CEO of a large 
Norwegian company co-operating with Statoil on CCS-related technology development, held 
that many Statoil employees were personally dedicated to realizing the project, but that top 
management had little motivation to develop and implement the CCS technology. Once the 
gas-fired power generator was built, Statoil had few profit-related incentives to prioritize it. 
The agreement between Statoil and the state, according to which the state covers the project 
costs and Statoil is the operator, gives Statoil a clear incentive to inflate the project budget. 
That is precisely what happened – the initial budget of NOK 5.9 billion in 2006 increased to 
NOK 20–25 billion in 2012 (Riksrevisjonen, 2013). The high-budget estimate gave the state 
good reason to cancel the project, which left Statoil with the licence it wanted but without 
having to ‘pay the price’ of building the full-scale CCS facility.
Whether or not this was Statoil’s strategy, the point here is to note that there was a 
significant dissonance between policy makers and industrialists in terms of the rationalities 
and objectives for pursuing the project. Policy makers were to a significant extent driven 
by the need to bridge divergent ideological positions within the governing coalition, while 
Statoil wanted the licence for the gas-fired power plant. Arguably, the development of the 
CCS project was in itself not the primary objective for any of the key actors. The rationales 
that the different actors brought into the project did not converge into effective planning and 
execution. To the contrary, the key actors each met their divergent primary objectives without 
actually achieving full-scale CCS at Mongstad.
Spatial dissonance: Mismatch between the territorial assumptions of the policy and the spatial 
dynamics of the industrial project
The political process behind the CCS project meant that no geographical locations other than 
Mongstad were considered for the CCS technology development. In a way, the plant being 
Norway’s largest point source polluter appears to be a good reason. Yet, as became apparent 
throughout the project’s life cycle, this location presented constraints and complexities that 
were not envisioned beforehand.
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The location and regional embeddedness of the existing refinery at Mongstad has 
influenced the types of activities that have been developed there. The increasing oil activities 
on the Norwegian continental shelf made Mongstad a favoured site for the expansion of oil-
related activities and generated the growth of a significant oil services industry immediately 
surrounding the refinery. These oil-related activities crowded out strategic plans for 
symbiotic industrial activities that could have generated other types of local and regional 
development. Besides, after Statoil took over ownership, the refinery no longer had an 
owner with competence and ambitions to invest in a broader range of petrochemical and 
raw material processing. Statoil’s focus was purely on oil and Mongstad developed into 
a medium-sized, relatively modern refinery close to the oil resources but far from major 
markets outside Norway. These oil-related technical service activities have occupied the 
physical space around the Mongstad refinery, making it difficult to fit symbiotic production 
activities that could have environmental effects onto the site itself. Researchers have 
developed a technological model for an eco-industrial park at Mongstad, but they emphasized 
the difficulty of adding on new production activities to an already cramped industrial site 
(Zhang et al., 2008). Also, it was discussed whether the innovation project geographically far 
from the most prominent technical research community at Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology (Trondheim) which also is the location for the R&D headquarters at Statoil 
was the most favourable. And regional industrial developers started to look for alternative 
CCS sites. In short, Mongstad has developed historically in response to corporate strategies 
and changing market conditions, which have favoured the oil side of the business rather than 
opening up for symbiotic industrial activities such as CCS.
For the CCS project, the fact that the gas-fired power plant was built adjacent to an oil 
refinery presented a series of technical difficulties. The operation of a refinery, a gas-fired 
power generator and a test centre for CCS technology led to increased demands on accessible 
electricity, steam and cooling water. It also led to the need for heightened security measures. 
Almost half of the costs of building the technology test centre went to building and upgrading 
infrastructure, a point of criticism noted in the State Auditor’s report (Riksrevisjonen, 2013).
Oil-related activity has also consumed the available labour capacity, making it difficult 
to find qualified personnel for non-oil-related activity in the region. The refinery is located 
in a semi-rural region with a local unemployment rate for some years of roughly 2% (NAV, 
2014). Local crowding out of non-oil-related activities is also characteristic of Hordaland 
and western Norway, a region with high levels of oil-related activities that attract most of 
the available qualified personnel into this high-wage sector and draw much of the capital 
investments. This has made it difficult to recruit qualified labour into more economically 
risky greening and renewable energy projects. In addition, Statoil’s concentration of 
management responsibilities and new practices of global sourcing have likely turned the 
attention of Statoil’s top management away from local cluster development. In an interview, 
a local industrial development officer portrayed Statoil as growing increasingly indifferent to 
local and regional development concerns (interview, 2013).
Apparently, there was little consideration of the spatiality of the industrial dynamics at 
Mongstad before it was decided upon politically. But the geographical conditions at the site 
and distances to key competence milieus presented significant complexities. In turn, there 
was a significant mismatch between the territorial assumptions of the policy and the spatial 
dynamics of the industrial project.
Temporal dissonance: Diverging timescales between policy processes and industry processes
The CCS project at Mongstad also suffered from divergence between political process 
timescales and the industry actors. For the political actors, the timing of the decision and 
announcement of the project corresponded to political strategizing – the infamous ‘moon 
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landing’ rhetoric was initially in the Prime Minister’s 2007 New Year speech – akin to a 
Norwegian State of the Union watched by the public at large. The political process set the 
time-related parameters for project planning. For the SV party, it was critical to set particular 
parameters on the building of the gas-fired power plant, in particular to be able to say that 
some carbon capture (capturing at least 100,000 tons of CO2) would be in place from day one, 
simultaneous with the start-up of the gas-fired generator. Further, it was established that full-
scale carbon capture would be in place by 2014. Originally, the SV party argued for full-scale 
capture from day one, but had to settle for a somewhat less ambitious plan after negotiations 
with the AP. Nevertheless, the project development plan was significantly shaped by party 
politics. For the SV party, with its environmentalist, climate-focused base and tradition of 
opposing gas-fired power plants, it was out of the question to accept granting a licence to 
Statoil without strong, climate-related requirements. This translated into a specific progress 
plan for the construction of the gas-fired power generator and the CCS technology.
The fact that the decision-making process progressed according to a ‘political timescale’ 
put the state at a significant disadvantage in negotiations with the main industry actor – 
Statoil – and introduced certain irrationalities into the process. (This is not to suggest that 
the project should not have been subject to a political process where both parties’ opinions 
are represented.) Since the project outlines had been decided politically and were committed 
to by the government, Statoil was in a comfortable bargaining position vis-à-vis the state. 
Publicly, the governing parties’ positions and the party leaders’ priorities were well known. 
It was already a given that the state-backed effort to promote the CCS would take place at 
Mongstad, Statoil’s plant, and in turn it was a given that Statoil would be the main partner. 
An arguably more rational process would have been that the government first decided what 
type of project it wanted and then negotiated with several different companies to get the best 
possible terms, as the UK government has done with its CCS commercialization programme 
competition. In the Mongstad case, such a solution was precluded by the chronology of the 
political process. Statoil accepted the basic requirements negotiated between the SV and 
AP parties (some carbon capture from day one, full-scale capture from 2014), but as stated 
by many critics, including the State Auditor, the contract between Statoil and the state was 
highly beneficial for Statoil because it contained virtually no enforcement mechanisms for 
the state and few incentives for Statoil to achieve the stipulated intentions.
The dissonance between the political and industrial timescales introduced other 
irrationalities and complexities into the project. For instance, the politically decided timeline 
included technological advances that had yet to be made. Basically, the government legislated 
that innovations should take place according to a set schedule. Despite the information about 
budget overruns and delays that had been available to the government for several months, 
the project went ahead until after the 2013 elections – most likely because cancelling the 
project would impact the election result. Cancelling the plans for full-scale carbon capture 
at Mongstad was in a sense symbolic – the life cycle of this industrial project roughly 
corresponded with the life cycle of the Stoltenberg government.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has not been to list the managerial errors that caused the failure 
of the CCS project at Mongstad. Instead, we are suggesting that underlying the project 
management failures (such as cost overruns and lack of clear project goals), there are 
disconnections between policy-making arena and the policy process on the one hand, and 
the industrial sector and actors within it, on the other. Conceptualizing and analysing these 
disconnections can help explain why managerial problems occurred, and make it easier to 
understand why similar problems occur elsewhere. We hold that the Mongstad case exhibits a 
set of mismatches and divergences between the internal logics of the policy-making arena and 
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the industrial sector that have broader relevance. In particular, the case can help to understand 
and conceptualize the constraints on policy-efforts of greening large-scale energy production.
We have here termed this phenomenon policy/industry dissonance, and analysed our 
case by looking at three aspects of such dissonance – rationality, spatiality and temporality. 
Rationality dissonance between the policy-making arena (essentially political parties) and 
the industry arena (Statoil) generated different objectives for the key actors involved and 
created a situation wherein the key actors each met their interests without actually executing 
the project. Spatial dissonance denotes the mismatch between the territorial assumptions 
of the policy and the spatial dynamics of the industrial project. The project was necessarily 
at a site where industrial functions had developed historically in response to corporate 
strategy and market conditions, and retrofitting the refinery with CCS technology presented 
significant problems and resulted in delays and cost overruns. Temporal dissonance denotes 
the different timescales of policy making on the one hand and industry and innovation on the 
other. For political reasons, it was necessary to set specific time frames for CO2 capture and 
for technological innovations in CCS technology, which corresponded poorly to the industrial 
processes of innovation and development.
The case study, and the conceptual framework we develop around it, can help nuance 
understandings of interactions between policy-making arenas on the one hand and industrial 
dynamics on the other. Both the RIS and MLP literatures are concerned with this interaction, 
but critics have suggested that there is a need to advance understandings of how government 
actions shape innovations and sustainability transitions in specific contexts. (Coenen et al., 
2012; Greenwood, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). There has been 
a tendency, particularly within RIS, that the agency of governments is reduced to being 
supporting organization for innovation processes. Empirically, our case brings nuance to 
these frameworks. Here the government plays an initiating role in a large-scale industrial 
project, which enables the case to illustrate more clearly the longer term dynamics of policy/
industry interactions. When analysing these dynamics, it becomes clear that they are not just 
occurring in the interface between two coherent arenas – the policy-making arena and the 
industrial arena have their own internal logics, contradictions and path dependencies. At its 
worst, government policy-making is more shaped by its own internal logics rather than by 
considerations for what policy mechanisms would be appropriate or effective. The view to 
these processes internal to specific arenas tend to be lost in when we take a systems perspective. 
As other geographers have emphasized, systems perspectives must strive to bring spatial 
complexities, including regional specialization, into account in understanding sustainability 
transitions, or lack of such (Hansen and Coenen, 2013). Our study has demonstrated how 
regional specialization (here through an embeddedness of oil-related industries) can have a 
conserving effect on the industrial structure and constrain transitions.
Our main concern here has been to understand and conceptualize the constraints on policy-
efforts of greening large-scale energy production. There is clearly a role for the state in pushing 
for a greening of energy systems, even though dissonance can hinder the implementation and 
effectiveness of government-initiated projects. Therefore, the observation from this case is not 
necessarily that ‘“big push’ policies in the energy sector are doomed to failure, but rather that 
they must be designed with the particularities of industrial dynamics and regional conditions 
in mind. Conceptualizing various aspects of policy/industry dissonance may be helpful here 
as a heuristic for thinking about potential problems and how they may be resolved.
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